Attack Politics: Who Goes Negative and Why? by Mattes, Kyle
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125
ATTACK POLITICS: WHO GOES NEGATIVE AND WHY?
Kyle Mattes
1 8 9 1
CA
LI
F
O
R
N
IA
 
IN
S T
IT U T E O F
 T E C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 1256
October 2006
Attack Politics: Who Goes Negative and Why?
Kyle Mattes
Abstract
I introduce a formal model of campaign strategy to show when candidates will en-
gage in negative campaigning and how it can affect election results. The model separates
campaign strategies by target (self or opponent) and dimension (issue or character), and
defines negative campaigning as attacking one’s opponent on the character dimension.
Whether candidates choose negative campaigning depends upon three factors: the pre-
conceptions of the voter, the voter’s preferred dimension, and the candidate types. I
show that eliminating negative campaigning has an ambiguous effect on voter welfare.
In some cases, eliminating the negative option can hurt superior candidates.
JEL classification numbers: D72, C72
Key words: campaigns, elections, negative campaigning, valence politics
Attack Politics: Who Goes Negative and Why?
Kyle Mattes
October 17, 2006
1 Introduction
Few campaign strategies are as maligned as negative campaigning. Take this advertisement,
for example:
"State Representative Randy Graf hung a picture of President Bush in [Grafs]
o¢ ce upside-down, because he disagrees with him! Grafs actions are disre-
spectful and wrong, especially in a time of war. Randy Graf has it upside-down.
Congressman Jim Kolbe proudly hangs the Presidents picture in his o¢ ce right-
side up. President Bush endorses Kolbe because he is dedicated to the ght for
freedom and lower taxes."(Jamestown Associates, 2004)
Here, Kolbe insinuates that his opponent Randy Graf is a traitor and bases this accusa-
tion upon Grafs inappropriate handling of a photograph. While potentially engaging for
staunch Bush or Kolbe supporters, the advertisement probably comes o¤ as specious char-
acter assassination to many others. Whenever the mudslinging becomes baseless or triing,
political observers fulminate against the o¤ending candidates. They accuse candidates who
engage in negative campaigning of being manipulators, slanderers, or liars. And candidates
who adopt a negative approach are frequently accused of purposefully angering the electorate
in order to reduce voter turnout. Political analysts claim that "in overwhelming numbers,
people say that negative campaigning is wrong and is damaging to our democracy" (Carr
2002), and the leaders of the Anglican church have called for an end to negative campaign-
ing (Watt 2001).1 Some political candidates have also ventured to state their opposition
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, Pasadena, CA, 91125. Email:
mattes@caltech.edu.
1Carr (2002) is quoting Kathryn Hunt of the University of Maines Margaret Chase Smith Center for
Public Policy.
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directly. For example, Kathleen Brown, in the 1994 California gubernatorial race, implored
all candidates to sign her proposal to "run a di¤erent kind of campaign. No negative ads
bashing your opponent, but instead an election about the issues."(Stanford PCL). Would
political discourse really be better o¤ without negative campaigning?
Undeniably, negative campaigning provides information to the voters and is often a fun-
damental part of candidatescampaign strategies. Arguing that it should be eliminated
essentially claims that it provides no useful information, and that it can never help a supe-
rior candidate win an election. So, in order to assess the critiques of negative campaigning,
one must ask: Who goes negative, when do they go negative, and how does it impact election
results?
In this paper, I answer these questions with a formal model of campaign strategy. I sepa-
rate campaign strategies into those focused on political issues and those focused on character
traits. Negative campaigning is dened as attacking ones opponent on the character di-
mension. With this model, I nd that the type of campaign chosen by political candidates
depends upon three factors: the traits of the candidates, the preconceptions of the voters,
and the deviation from voter expectations of the information presented to them. This helps
to understand why one cannot rely on simple benchmarks, such as the closeness of the race,
to determine optimal candidate strategies. Finally, I show that while in some cases, elim-
inating negative campaigning provides voters with more useful information, in other cases
it makes the candidates impossible to distinguish. One cannot use a broad sword to cut
away all of the negativity from a campaign without permitting inferior candidates to slip
into o¢ ce through the resulting gaps.
2 What is Negative Campaigning?
In order to answer these questions, we need a formal denition of negative campaigning. It
should capture the fundamental aspects that make campaign themes negative and also allow
for easy comparison with other campaign styles. Specically, it should distinguish between
promoting oneself and attacking the opponent while also separating campaigning on political
issues from campaigning on character traits. This distinction is important but certainly
not a recent innovation, since character has long been recognized as prominent to political
persuasion.2 While political issues (such as gun control, abortion, and UN relations) are
generally conceived on a left-right continuum (Poole and Rosenthal 1985), character issues
2Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, (Book 1, Chapter 2) argued that "of the modes of persuasion furnished by
the spoken word there are three kinds. The rst kind depends on the personal character of the speaker;
the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof,
provided by the words of the speech itself." (Aristotle, ed. Honeycutt 2004).
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(such as honesty, competence, and leadership ability) are more accurately represented by a
valence dimension.3 A valence dimension measures an attribute on which all voters have the
same preferences, generally preferring more to less (or vice versa). The current literature
on negative campaigning does not provide a clear denition of campaign strategies across
both the ideology and character dimensions. As a result, there is a lack of consensus on the
meaning of the important terms regarding negative campaigning. This can be resolved by
using the simple construct I outline below.
Four Campaign Types
A framework with two dimensions and two candidates suggests four di¤erent campaign
possibilities. The following matrix delineates each campaign type:
Table 1: Four Campaign Types
Issue Dimension Character Dimension
Talk about ones opponent Issue Di¤erentiation Negative Campaigning
Talk about oneself Issue Bolstering Positive Campaigning
Each of the four main cells in Table 1 represents a di¤erent campaign strategy. As the
table shows, I specically dene negative campaigning as campaigning against an opponent
on the character dimension. In this framework, stating that an opponent has the wrong
stance on political issues is issue di¤erentiation, which is a separate campaign strategy from
negative campaigning. Issue campaigning, while it may be caustic in tone, is not negative
in the sense that it impugns character, hence the separation by dimension. Also shown in
Table 1 are the two self-promotional campaign types. Discussing ones own valence qualities
is dened as positive campaigning, and promoting ones own position is issue bolstering.
Of course, most political advertisements are not conned to a single dimension, but
instead combine various di¤erent themes. This framework captures the overarching themes
that appear in multiple campaign advertisements, and it is these themes which can be
categorized into specic dimensions and campaign types.
Why Include Character Campaigning?
Including a valence dimension provides a simple means of separating political issues, on
which voters have varied opinions, from character traits, about which voterspreferences
essentially agree. Stokes (1992) shows that both left-right and valence dimensions are needed
to accurately represent voterspreferences. Popkin (1991) argues that voters use personal
information about a candidate as a proxy for information that is otherwise di¢ cult to obtain
specically, evidence regarding how that candidate might behave in o¢ ce. Furthermore,
3see Stokes (1992)
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psychological studies show that when individuals form impressions of situations or other
people, they weigh negative information more heavily than positive (Fiske 1980; Hamilton
and Zanna 1972). Impressions formed on the basis of negative information, moreover, tend to
be more lasting and more resistant to change (Cobb and Kuklinski 1997). As character is an
important aspect of politics, character assaults are nothing new, and are certainly not going
away. They have been prominent in politics throughout the history of the United States.
For example, John Adamssupporters accused Thomas Je¤erson of being an atheist, the Van
Buren campaign attempted but failed to brand William Henry Harrison as broken-down and
incompetent, and proponents of James Blaine mocked Grover Clevelands admitted indelity
(Ferling 2004; Cleaves 1939; Troy 1996).
Other Approaches to Negative Campaigning
Some observers make the error of evaluating the veracity of the advertising to determine its
negativity.4 The underlying problem is, as West (1993) explains, that "observers often dene
negativity as anything they do not like about campaigns." While the truth of the statements
contained within the ads is clearly important, it is a separate issue from the style of the
campaign. Nearly everyone is in agreement that campaign strategies involving calumny can
harm the political system. However, not all negative campaigning is mendacious, nor are
all lies negative campaigning. Candidates can just as easily lie (or stretch the truth) about
themselves as they can present misinformation about their opponents.
Instead, I use a paradigm similar to that of Polburn and Yi (2006), in which candidates
can campaign on either ideology or character. My model di¤ers from theirs in that I give
candidates a more complete set of campaign choices. I show that when candidates are also
able to campaign about their own character (positive campaigning) and their opponents
ideological position (issue di¤erentiation), in some cases eliminating negative campaigning
can improve voter welfare.
Other formal studies of negative campaigning have not addressed the fundamental dis-
tinction between issue and character campaigning, and instead o¤er a very broad denition
of the term.5 For example, Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) dene negative campaigning as
"that which attacks the other candidate personally, the issues for which the other candidate
stands, or the party of the other candidate. Lau and Pomper (2002) say that "negative
campaigning is talking about the opponent his or her programs, accomplishments, quali-
cations, associates, and so on with the focus, usually, on the defects of these attributes."
4For further explanations in support of this argument, see Lau and Pomper (2002) and Mayer (1996).
5Although in the model of Harrington and Hess (1994), candidates inherit initial locations on both a
valence and an issue dimension, they are restricted to campagining on the issue dimension. Negative
campaigning is dened as relocating your opponent on the issue dimension; positive campaigning is relocating
yourself on the issue dimension.
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These denitions equate negative campaigning with "campaigning against an opponent",
a category that covers nearly the entire spectrum of political advertising. But there are
many reasons to invoke an opponents name during political discourse. Mayer (1996) argues
that "any serious, substantive discussion about what a candidate intends to do after the
election can only be conducted by talking about the aws and shortcomings of current poli-
cies." This means that for candidates challenging incumbents, campaigning about political
issues requires campaigning against the opponent. For example, if a challenger intends to
lower taxes, implicit in that argument is the disapproval of the current tax rate. But, there
is little explanatory power gained by labeling every challengers issue ads as negative. Com-
parisons, which are often necessary, also provide voters with a better standard of evaluation
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995). If an opponent is against the death penalty, stating that
fact should be considered issue di¤erentiation, and not negative campaigning. Using broader
denitions conates vastly di¤erent campaign strategies into the general category of "neg-
ative", making it more di¢ cult to establish the distinction between character campaigning
and issue campaigning.
Some analysts focus on other aspects of political strategy that are interesting but not
unique to negative campaigning. For example, although Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) do
not provide an explicit denition, they imply that negative campaigning equates to negative
tone. However, the tone of an advertisement can be di¢ cult to determine. Sigelman and
Kugler (2003) show that voters can strongly disagree in their perceptions about the tone of a
given campaign. This is why it is much more informative to demarcate campaign strategies
by their overall content and themes. The Jim Kolbe advertisement cited above does not need
sinister music or a threatening announcer for it to be categorized as predominantly negative.
It is negative because it calls Randy Graf disrespectful, and implies that he is a traitor.
Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) assume that positive campaigning attracts undecided voters
only, while negative campaigning turns the opponents supporters into undecided voters,
and creates a boomerang e¤ect in which the attacker loses his own voters to the undecided
pool. In another example, Hinich and Munger (1989) assume that candidates use negative
campaigning to increase the variance of their opponents policy, and positive campaigning to
decrease the variance of their own policy. This systematically proscribes a candidate from
clarifying an opponents extremist position (e.g. by providing details of his voting record) or
clarifying an opponents reprobate character (e.g. by providing details of his police record).
In other words, going negative does not necessarily entail creating uncertainty about an
opponent.
All of this has confused the empirical literature. Because of the lack of a precise, con-
sensus denition of negative campaigning, there is no solid foundation for empirical research
on the subject. Thus, it is no surprise that the outcomes of empirical studies are inconsis-
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tent. For example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) concluded that negative campaigning
decreases turnout; Wattenberg and Brians (1999) and Freedman and Goldstein (1999) deter-
mined that it increases turnout; Finkel and Geer (1998) found no consistent e¤ect between
negative campaigning and turnout. In another line of research, Theilmann and Wilhite
(1998) found that a candidate tends to go negative if behind or in a dead heat. However,
Sigelman and Buell (2003) found that in U.S. presidential races, major-party tickets were
far more attack-oriented only if their election prospects looked bleak. Yet, Sigelman and
Shiraev (2002) concluded that the relative negativity of the candidates is not a function of
who is ahead and who is behind, and that candidates rarely adjust their strategies due to the
ebb and ow of the campaign. Plus, Lau and Pomper (2001) showed that position in the
polls does not a¤ect a candidates usage of negative strategies. In a meta-analysis of em-
pirical studies of negative campaigning, Lau et al. (1999) found no reliable statistical basis
for concluding that negative ads are liked less than positive ones, or that negative political
ads are more e¤ective than positive political ads, or that negative campaigning a¤ects voter
turnout.
The di¢ culty in obtaining consistent empirical results indicates the need to use a def-
inition of negative campaigning that allows the demarcation of campaign themes into the
four types presented in Table 1. In the next section, I incorporate these campaign types
into a theoretical model that can be used as a foundation to understand the fundamental
aspects of campaign strategy decisions. This framework also facilitates a shift in focus from
discrete ads, which often combine multiple themes, to the underlying campaign strategy, in
which themes are more readily separable.6 Most importantly, it provides answers to the
original questions posed earlier: Who goes negative, when do they go negative, and how does
it impact election results?
3 The General Model
In this section, I incorporate the matrix of campaign strategy denitions from Section 2
into a formal model of campaign strategy. The model is a game for political campaigns, in
which candidates maximize their standing with the electorate via the optimal dissemination
of information. In the basic form of this model, there are two candidates, A and B. The
two candidates inherit positions on each of two separable dimensions, Issues and Character.
The issue dimension, I, is the traditional left-right dimension, given by the set f 1; 0; 1g.
6The Kolbe ad above, for example, combines character attacks on Graf with a non-sequitur about Kolbes
stand on taxation. Since political commericals can incorporate many themes, it is better to look at the
array of advertisements o¤ered by a campaign before determining the candidates politcal strategy. One
negative comment does not necessarily constitute a negative strategy.
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The character dimension, C, is a valence dimension, given by the set f x; xg .
There is one voter, V .7 Preferences of the voter are single-peaked on the issue dimension,
and the voters ideal policy point is 0. By denition, the voter always prefers higher values on
the valence dimension. Thus, the voters ideal point in (I; C) space is (0; x): She represents
the preferences of the median voter on the issue dimension, and of every voter on the valence
dimension.8
Candidates campaign by revealing the true location of one candidate on one dimension,
which will create a baseline for analyzing candidatesstrategic behavior. The goal of the
voter is to maximize her expected utility. Using the candidatescampaign messages and her
prior information, she will attempt to determine both the issue position and the character
type of the two candidates, A and B. The voters utility function for candidate ` is:
UV (`) =  j(I`)j + (C`) (1)
So, the voter will choose the candidate ` that maximizes the expected value of UV (`). In
the case of a tie, the voter will ip a coin to choose between the candidates. The winning
candidate implements his preferred policy and receives a utility, , from winning the election,
and zero from losing the election. So the utility function for candidate ` is U` = !`, where
!` is the probability of candidate ` winning the election.
3.1 Candidate Locations
Initially, the candidateslocations ` = (I`; C`) are assigned by nature and both are known
to the candidates, but not known to the voter.9 However, the voter is aware that the type
` of each candidate has been drawn independently from  = [f 1; 0; 1gfx; xg] with the
following distribution:10
The value p is the probability that a candidate has good personal qualities (x), while 1 p
is the probability he has undesirable character traits ( x). Furthermore, each candidate has
probability 1  2q of being a centrist, and probability q of favoring each extreme.11 Since p
and q are independent, at this stage the voters expected utility is  2q+ x(2p   1): Since
7For consistency, I will heretofore assume that the voter is female and the candidates are male.
8With perfect information, the Median Voter Theorem holds in a space with voters having single-peaked
preferences on the issue dimension, and nondecreasing preferences on one valence dimension (see Groseclose
1999).
9The important point is that a candidate will know his opponents position better than the voter does.
10Although simple, this provide enough richness to capture all of the relevant cases (i.e. one candidate is
better on both dimensions; each candidate is better on one dimension; candidates are equal on one or more
dimensions).
11An alternative formulation, in which the variance is di¤erent for each candidate (e.g. one candidate is
the incumbent), is presented in the appendix.
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the voter has Euclidean preferences on the issue dimension, the issue positions of  1 and 1
are mathematically identical when calculating the voters expected utility.
The x term, which also denes the character dimensions range, captures the importance
to the voter of the issue dimension relative to the character dimension.12 As the value of
x increases, this can be interpreted as the voter caring more about the character dimension
relative to the issue dimension. Note that the issue dimension range is normalized at [ 1; 1]
to better capture these e¤ects. So, if the voter cares mainly about personal qualities, x will
be of high magnitude and dwarf the utility e¤ects of political issues. Conversely, if the voter
cares mainly about policy issues, this will be represented by near-zero values of x.
This one-period game consists of two phases: the campaign phase and the voting phase.
3.2 Campaign Phase
In this game, each candidate has a limited budget, so he can choose exactly one campaign
type. Although simplied, this is consistent with the fact that campaigns generally have
an overarching theme. A candidates campaign is the announcement of one of the four
unknown locations.13 That is, a candidate can choose from among the campaign strategies
originally shown in Table 1:
Issue Di¤erentiation: Revealing the opponents location on the issue dimension.
Issue Bolstering: Revealing ones own location on the issue dimension.
Negative Campaigning: Revealing the opponents location on the character dimen-
sion.
Positive Campaigning: Revealing ones own location on the character dimension.
Formally, this means that each candidate ` must simultaneously choose a strategy s` :
[fx; xg  f 1; 0; 1g]2 ! , where
 : f(CA = x); (CA =  x); (CB = x); (CB =  x); (IA = 0); (IA = 1); (IB = 0)(IB = 1)g
(2)
On line (2) above, each action a 2  is designated by the notation (D` = ), where D is
the dimension of revelation, ` is the candidate whose information is provided, and  is the
location. For example, (CA = x) means that candidate A is revealed to be located at x on
the character dimension. While  contains eight di¤erent types of messages, the realization
of A and B limits the possible choices from  to four.
12It is convenient to use x as a weight. It technically consists of two components: the weight (w) the
voter gives character relative to issues, and the range () of the character dimension. Thus, the voter utility
function could be alternatively written as: UV (`) =  j(I`)j + w  (C`), where E(C`) = v(2p  1) and v = 1:
13This can be thought of as the theme that the candidate most emphasizes during his campaign.
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Notice that each of the possible campaign choices leads to a change in the voters expected
utility for one of the two candidates. Each candidate ` improves his standing in the election
whenever his campaign announcement a` 2  increases the voters expected utility for ` or
decreases the voters expected utility for  `. Let d`(a`; a `) indicate the benet to candidate
` from employing campaign strategy a` with voter posterior beliefs  and the opponent using
strategy a `. In other words, the function d`(a`; a `) shows changes in the voters utility
di¤erence between the candidates, and can be written as:
d`(a) = E[UV (`) j a]  E[UV ( `) j a] (3)
3.3 Voting Phase
In this phase, the voter chooses the candidate who gives her the highest expected utility.
In making this decision, the voter must rely on both her prior knowledge of the location
distribution and the information given her by the candidates via the two campaign themes.14
Although there is undoubtedly a wide range of analytic ability which can be ascribed to
voters, I will consider two archetypes of voter, described as follows:15
Naive voter: The voter accepts the candidatestwo announcements a 2 , but does
not consider the impact of the information revelation on any other dimension.
Sophisticated voter: The voter assumes that the revelation of a candidate may also
give information about the traits (of both candidates) that the candidate did not reveal. She
uses the information revealed by the candidates and the candidatesentire announcement
strategies s() to rene her understanding of the candidatesspatial positions.
The voter, regardless of analytic ability, is not perfect. In any election, she has the
probability "(d`(a)) ! [0; 12 ] of "miscalculating" and voting for the wrong candidate. I
assume that "(0)  1
2
, that "(z) > 0 8z; that the function " is monotonic, and that the
rst derivative "0 < 0.16 So, as the di¤erence between the candidates increases, the voter
is less likely to err. Because the probability of winning also increases with the utility
di¤erence between candidates, this helps avoid situations where losing candidates can pick
any campaign strategy in equilibrium.
When discussing election outcomes, candidate ` is said to "win" the election if the voter
intends to vote for candidate ` because ` gives her a higher expected utility. In this case,
`s opponent,  `, is said to "lose" the election. If the voter has the same expected utility
14In this model, the voter cannot seek out information on her own.
15Eyster and Rabin (2005), citing "evidence that people do not fully take into account how other peoples
actions depend on these other peoples information," model a cursed equilibrium in which playersanalytical
abilities lie on a continuum between Bayesian updating and ignoring updating altogether.
16For example, a quantal response function would t these criteria.
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for each candidate, the race will be called a tie, regardless of the coin ip outcome or the
subsequent vote.
4 Results
In this section, I use the general model to answer the questions on negative campaigning
that I posed above. First, I dene an equilibrium for this game and prove existence. Then,
I explain how the candidates will choose strategies, and later, I discuss election outcomes
with a particular emphasis on the importance of negative campaigning. I begin by assuming
that the voter is of the naive type.
4.1 Elections With a Naive Voter
Definition 1 Naive Voter Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept for this game is perfect Bayesian in pure strategies. Thus, for
each candidate ` and for the voter V; the equilibrium consists of:
(1) Candidate strategies ~s`(`;  `) 2 argmax` !`(s`; ~s `(); ~ ; )
where !`(s`; ~s `(); ~ ; ) = ~(s`; ~s `())+(1 2~(s`; ~s `())) "(d`(s`(); ~s `()))
(2) Voter strategies ~(a) 2 argmaxEUV (~s; )
(3) Voter posterior beliefs ( j a) are identical to the voters prior beliefs about the
probability distribution unless the candidate location is directly revealed by a.
It follows from (1) that if the voter chooses candidate `, his probability of winning,
!`(s`; ~s `(); ~ ; ) = 1  "(d`(s`(); ~s `())). But if the voter chooses candidate `0s opponent,
his probability of winning is only "(d`(s`(); ~s `())), which is the chance of voter error.
Furthermore, this denition simply requires that the voter maximizes her expected utility,
and that each candidate ` is using a best response to the opponents equilibrium strategy
~s `. In other words, given the strategy of his opponent, a candidate should not have any
incentive to change strategies.
Proposition 1 There always exists an equilibrium if the voter is naive.
Explanation and Proof. In equilibrium, the voter strategy is simply to vote for the
candidate that yields the highest expected utility given her beliefs. Thus if EUV (`) >
EUV ( `), then ~(s`; ~s `()) = (1; 0) for ` and  `, respectively. In the case where
EUV (`) = EUV ( `), ~ = (12 ; 12), and then !` = 12 for each candidate. Candidates maxi-
mize d`(a`), where a` is any of the four possible disclosures. They do not have to take into
account the opponents strategy a `, because the voter cannot make any inferences from the
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campaign styles that either candidate did not choose. So, d`(a`) = E[UV (`) j a`] E[UV ( `)
j a`]: The voters original expected utility for each candidate, UV (`), is  2q+ x(2p   1):
Calculating d`(a`) in the naive voter case just requires computing the change in the voters
expected utility once the voter learns that a` is true. Issue di¤erentiation changes UV ( `) by
1  2q, while issue bolstering changes UV (`) by 2q. Negative campaigning changes UV ( `)
by 2xp, while positive campaigning changes UV (`) by 2x(1 p). Because "(d`(s`(); ~s `()))
is monotonic, a candidate who chooses a` to maximize d`(a`; a `) also maximizes his prob-
ability of winning the election. Therefore, choosing any option other than the action a`
that maximizes d`(a`) is a dominated strategy because it lowers a candidates probability of
winning.
So, candidates will try to nd a dimension to which the voter will be most responsive.
Three factors determine the campaign themes chosen. First is the dimension that is most
important to the voter. For example, character campaigning is more likely as x increases.
To see this, dene P as the larger of p and 1   p, and Q as the larger of 2q and 1   2q.
So, P designates which character strategy has the highest potential upside, while Q does
the same for issue strategies. Character campaigning is preferred whenever x > Q
2P
; issue
campaigning when x < Q
2P
: The second factor is the voters preconceptions about each
dimension. The voters prior beliefs about candidates issue stances and character traits
determine which campaign strategy will provide information that most diverges from those
preconceptions. For example, when p increases, she believes that candidates are better
people, and so negative campaigning becomes a more e¤ective strategy because it provides a
greater deviation from the voters prior expectations. Whenever p > 1
2
, negative campaigning
will be more e¤ective than positive, and whenever 2q > 1
2
, issue bolstering will be more
e¤ective than issue di¤erentiation. The third key factor is the realization of candidate
types.
Following is an example of strategy choice at work.
Example 1 Candidates With Di¤erent Strengths
Assume that candidate A is (1; x), candidate B is (0; x), p = 3
4
; q = 1
3
; and x = 1:
In other words, candidate A is an extremist with good valence characteristics, and can-
didate B is a moderate with bad valence characteristics. But from the voters perspective,
each candidate is a good guy with probability 3
4
, bad with probability 1
4
, an extremist with
probability 2
3
, and a moderate with probability 1
3
. Since Q
2P
= 4
9
< x and p > 1
2
; negative
campaigning is optimal. Notice that this is just another way of saying that negative cam-
paigning, if available as a strategy (i.e. the opponent is a bad character type), maximizes
d`(a`). However, candidate B, due to his opponents valence advantage, is forced to cam-
paign on the issue dimension. While A employs negative campaigning, B resorts to his best
option, issue bolstering.
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Example 1 shows how highly dissimilar campaigns can occur whenever there are highly
dissimilar opponents. Just because two candidates employ wildly di¤erent tactics does not
mean that one of those candidates is making a strategic blunder. Based upon this paradigm,
we should generally expect political campaigns to di¤er in content. This is due not only to
the wide variety of candidates that run for political o¢ ce, but also to the changing relevance
to voters of political and candidate-specic issues.
I will now move forward and discuss election outcomes. For instance, in Example 1,
while A uses an ideal theme (negative campaigning) and wins the election, Bs best option
is to continue with issue bolstering.17 Perhaps unsurprisingly, a candidate who is better on
both dimensions will win the election.
Proposition 2 Let ` be a strictly better candidate than  ` if C` > C ` and jI`j < jI `j.
A strictly better candidate will always win the election.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that candidate A is (1; x) and candidate
B is (0; x). Before the campaign phase, a vote for either candidate gives equal expected
utility to the voter. However, every campaign revelation will either improve voter utility
from electing B or reduce voter utility from electing A. As a result, the strictly better
candidate, B, will win the election.
While it is encouraging that strictly better candidates will win elections, this result does
not carry over to weakly better candidates, as shown below.
Proposition 3 Let ` be a weakly better candidate than  ` if C`  C ` and jI`j  jI `j,
with at least one of these being a strict inequality. A weakly better candidate will not always
win the election.
Proof. Example 2 below demonstrates this.
Example 2 A Weakly Better Candidate
Assume that candidate A is (0; x), candidate B is (1; x), p = 3
4
; q = 1
3
; and x = 1:
In other words, candidate A is a moderate with bad valence characteristics, and candidate
B is an extremist with bad valence characteristics. Because, just as in Example 1, a negative
campaign maximizes d`(a`), in equilibrium both candidates will be mudslinging, and the race
will end in a dead heat.
Here, the voter denes character as the dimension of competition. Because the voter
prefers to know about valence characteristics, she never gets the opportunity to learn about
17Note that whenever 2q > 2Px, then issue bolstering will win for A. If 1   2q > 2Px, then issue
di¤erentiation will win for A. If Q < 2px, then negative campaigning will win for B, and if Q < 2x(1  p),
then positive campaigning will win for B.
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political issues. In fact, e¤orts by a candidate to concentrate on policy issues will backre,
because he will have remained silent about character, which is the dimension most important
to the voter. Because it isnt possible to give the voter perfect information by making every
dimension salient in the political debate, a weakly better candidate may lose.
A simple remedy to improve the election outcome in Example 2 would be to eliminate
negative campaigning. This would shift the campaign to the issue dimension, on which A
is a clear winner.
In general, negative campaigning will hurt election outcomes (by giving an inferior candi-
date a much better chance to win) whenever the following two conditions are met. First, the
voter must care mainly about character issues and second, candidates must have similarly
poor character traits but signicantly di¤erent issue positions.
However, as Example 3 shows below, in some elections negative campaigning is the only
way to weed out an inferior candidate.
Example 3 Another Weakly Better Candidate
Assume that candidate A is (0; x), candidate B is (0; x), and that p = 3
4
; q = 1
3
; and
x = 1:
In other words, both candidates are moderates and A is of superior character. As in the
previous examples, negative campaigning is the ideal campaign theme. Without interference,
A will choose negative campaigning, and B will choose issue bolstering. However, once the
option of negative campaigning is removed, A will also choose issue bolstering. But now,
the race will be a tie. In this example, negative campaigning improves voter welfare because
it allows the identity of the messenger to outweigh the theme of his message.
Negative campaigning is more likely to a¤ect election outcomes when the voter cares
strongly about character (x > Q
2P
) and has a generally positive opinion of candidates (p >
1
2
).18 Interestingly, in a world of truthful revelations, only a candidate of bad character will
strive to eliminate negative campaigning. As in Example 2, he may be trying highlight his
issue advantage. Or, as in Example 3, he might be hoping to hide his character disadvantage
and move the ght to a more neutral ground. The intricacies of the situation will dictate
whether a shift away from negative campaigning will help or hinder the political environment.
4.2 Elections with a Sophisticated Voter
Next, I consider elections with a sophisticated voter who uses Bayesian updating to analyze
the candidatescampaign revelations. As with the naive voter variant, this game always
has an equilibrium.
18Recall that P is the larger of p and 1  p, and Q is the larger of 2q and 1  2q.
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Definition 2 Sophisticated Voter Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept for this game is perfect Bayesian in pure strategies. Thus, for
each candidate ` and for the voter V; the equilibrium consists of:
(1) Candidate strategies ~s`(`;  `) 2 argmax` !`(s`; ~s `(); ~ ; )
where !`(s`; ~s `(); ~ ; ) = ~(s`; ~s `())+(1 2~(s`; ~s `())) "(d`(s`(); ~s `()))
(2) Voter strategies ~(a) 2 argmaxEUV (s; )
(3) Voter posterior beliefs ( j a) which is a probability distribution derived from
Bayeslaw using ~s whenever possible.
The di¤erence between this and Denition 1 is in the rules governing voter posterior
beliefs ( j a); as the sophisticated voter makes use of Bayesian updating. As with the Naive
Voter Equilibrium, the voter must be maximizing her expected utility, and each candidate `
must be using a best response to the opponents equilibrium strategy ~s `.
Consider any strategy ~s`(`;  `) in which candidate ` always chooses a specic campaign
a` whenever possible. Then, while the sophisticated voter can rightly assume that a` is
unavailable if candidate ` does not choose it, she may not necessarily be able to make any
additional inferences if a` is chosen. Furthermore, if both candidates are using a` whenever
possible, and both candidates campaign with a`, the sophisticated voters utility updates
will look like those of the naive voter.
So, dene a as the campaign strategy (or set of strategies) that maximizes d`(a) =
E[UV (`) j (a)]  E[UV ( `) j a] whenever a` = a ` and voter beliefs  are that candidates
will choose a` whenever they can.
It seems logical that candidates would prefer to reveal the information, a, that is most
useful to the voter. However, there are equilibria in the sophisticated voter game where
candidates choose a campaign theme a` whenever they can, even though a` 6= a: Following
is an example of this:
Example 4 Candidates Ignore the Voters Campaign Preferences
Assume that, p = 3
5
; q = 2
5
; and x = 4
5
. Here, a is negative campaigning, meaning that
all other things equal, the voter would be more likely to vote for a candidate that engages
in negative campaigning. However, suppose that candidate strategies (and voter beliefs)
dictate that issue bolstering will be chosen whenever possible. So, a moderate candidate
will always reveal his own issue position even if his opponent is of bad character. It is an
equilibrium when candidates choose among strategies in the following order: issue bolstering
(IB), negative campaigning (NC), positive campaigning (PC), issue di¤erentiation (ID).19
19Candidates here avoid choosing strategies that reveal harmful information about themselves or good
information about their opponent. Assume that the for any harmful campaign, the voter assumes that
candidate is (1; x) and his opponent is (0; x).
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For example, if a candidate uses positive campaigning, this means he is an extremist and his
opponent is of good character.
Candidates using issue bolstering will have no incentive to deviate to negative campaign-
ing. To see this, suppose that both candidates are (0; x) and that a = (IB; IB). Voter
beliefs are that ` =  ` = (0; x(2p 1)). If candidate ` switches so that a = (NC; IB); voter
beliefs are now that ` = (1; x(2p  1)) and that  ` = (0; x): Voter utility UV (`) =  0:84
and UV ( `) =  0:8; so the election favors  `. In general, issue bolstering raises voter utility
by 2q, while negative campaigning lowers voter utility for the opponent by 2px   (1   2q),
because the sophisticated voter assumes from the lack of issue bolstering that ` is an extrem-
ist. So, this equilibrium requires that 2px < 1:20 However, if p = 0:7; now ` has incentive
to switch to a = (NC; IB) from a = (IB; IB); because UV (`) =  0:68 and UV ( `) =  0:8;
and the election favors `.
Although there can be many equilibria, I will now focus on the one in which candidates
rst try to campaign using a. This is useful not just because the candidates show more
responsiveness to the voter, but also because the equilibrium I am about to characterize
exists for all values of p, q, and x. First, dene a as the campaign strategy on the opposite
dimension from a that maximizes d`(a) = E[UV (`) j (a)]   E[UV ( `) j a] whenever
a` = a ` and voter beliefs  are that candidates will choose a` whenever they can.
Proposition 4 The following is always an equilibrium. Candidates use strategy a if a is
available (i.e. does not reveal information harmful to the campaigner). If unable to use a,
candidates choose a: If unable to choose either a or a, candidates maximize d`(a`) as if
the voter were naive. If any candidate uses a harmful strategy (i.e. reveals bad information
about himself, or good information about the opponent), then he is assumed to be (1; x)
and his opponent (0; x).21
The proof is in the appendix.
The reason a must be on the opposite dimension from a is that once both candidates
fail to choose a, the sophisticated voter gains perfect information on the dimension of a, so
any revelation on that dimension is redundant. And if exactly one candidate chooses a (e.g.
negative campaigning), then his opponent cant protably choose the opposite strategy on
that dimension (in this case, positive campaigning). Note that whenever neither candidate
uses a, the voter will always get perfect information about the candidate types from the
campaign revelations.
20Otherwise, the proof of this equilibrium is analogous to that of Proposition 4 below.
21The voters strategy is ~(s`; ~s `()) = (1; 0) for ` and  `, respectively, whenever EUV (`) > EUV ( `).
In the case where EUV (`) = EUV ( `), ~ = (12 ; 12 ):
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Again, unlike the other possible equilibria, the one from Proposition 4 always exists. In
any other equilibrium, candidates and voters would have to agree in some cases to prefer
a strategy other than a. Then, for some values of p, q, and x, the candidates will have
incentives to defect as in Example 4.
In the Proposition 4 equilibrium, the existence of a sophisticated voter rarely changes
the election outcome of the analogous naive voter case. One exception is that she chooses
a weakly better candidate more often than the naive voter does. This happens only when
the voter cares so strongly about one dimension that she prefers both types of information
on that dimension. Following is an example.
Example 5 Campaign Strategy Dependent on Voter Sophistication
Assume that candidate A is (0; x), candidate B is (1; x), p = 1
4
; q = 1
3
; and x = 2.
In other words, candidate A is a moderate with bad valence characteristics, and candidate
B is an extremist with bad valence characteristics. But from the voters perspective, each
candidate is a good guy with probability 3
4
, bad with probability 1
4
, an extremist with
probability 2
3
, and a moderate with probability 1
3
. And because x = 2, the voter cares twice
as much about character relative to issues. Since negative campaigning maximizes d`(a), if
the voter were naive, A would reveal (CB =  x), B would reveal (CA =  x), and the election
would end in a tie. But what if the voter is sophisticated? Then, candidate A can protably
switch to issue bolstering (IA = 0), because his message of (CB =  x) is redundant. The
sophisticated voter can infer (CB =  x) from Bs failure to reveal (CB = x). Furthermore,
B, who is an extremist facing a moderate, cannot protably change to another campaign
tactic. Thus candidate A, the weakly better candidate, will now win the election. Note
that if candidate A reveals (IA = 0), he must be sure that the voter is sophisticated. With
a naive voter, if A chooses issue bolstering, it ensures his defeat.
Again, this situation only occurs if the two strategies that maximize d`(a) are on the same
dimension. Otherwise, a weakly better candidate may still lose the election, and Examples
2 and 3 still apply. Thus eliminating negative campaigning still has an ambiguous e¤ect on
voter welfare.
In the sophisticated voter equilibrium, campaign strategy still depends upon the candi-
datestraits, the voters predispositions, and the voters preference between personal and
political information. There will be more negative campaigning when voters care about
valence issues, when voters assume ex ante that political candidates are good people, and
when candidates have poor valence characteristics that can be exploited. Note that the
latter of these three conditions is predicated on the assumption that candidates will have
less success with misleading and false revelations relative to truthful ones. This point is
taken up briey in the nal section.
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5 Conclusion
First, I will review the questions posed at the outset. Who engages in negative campaigning?
If negative campaigning is the ideal strategy, any rational candidate does so. Otherwise, it
may be a strategy forced upon a candidate whose issue position or character does not meet
voter standards. Of course, in this case, the candidate is likely to lose the election anyway.
When do candidates choose negative campaigning? Campaign choices depend upon
three factors: the character and issue positions of the candidates, the predispositions of the
voters, and the dimensions of political importance to the voters. These three variables
should be the starting point of any empirical testing of this model. Negative campaigning
will be more likely when the voters have positive initial opinions of the candidates personal
qualities and care strongly about the character traits of o¢ ce seekers.
Candidates at the onset of a campaign will use these three variables to choose a strategic
goal and a plan toward achieving that goal. It follows naturally from this model that
candidates, who have already chosen the optimal campaign revelations, should have little
incentive to alter campaign strategies throughout the course of a campaign. Instead, the
candidates could change tactics to ensure that their original strategy is properly conveyed
to the electorate.
When does negative campaigning matter? It can help a superior candidate to victory,
but can also help an inferior candidate muddle the landscape. Again this depends on the
voters. If they are especially interested in information about character, they are likely to see
more negative campaigning. Interestingly, voters who generally have positive impressions of
political candidates will also see more negative campaigning, which could frustrate the voters,
as the information is dissonant with their general perception of politicians. Conversely,
voters who generally view politicians as untrustworthy scoundrels will be less inundated with
negative advertising, because these people would view the information as less surprising and
so would not be much a¤ected by it.
As mentioned in the previous section, a logical next step would be to repeat the same
analysis while allowing candidates to misrepresent the true character and issue positions.
While the model presented here assumes that candidates will tell the truth, this extension
would explain how changes in the likelihood of getting caught lying would a¤ect their cam-
paign strategies.
Another potentially useful approach would be to introduce uncertainty regarding the
median voters ideal point, as in Wittman (2001). This would create yet another distinction
between issue and character campaigning, because for a valence dimension, there is never
uncertainty about the voters preferences. She always prefers higher values.
The voter could also have preferences for candidates who o¤er a smaller degree of risk (i.e.
discrepancies in the variance of the two candidates). For instance, an incumbents variance
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would usually be smaller than that of a previously unknown challenger, because of the voters
presumed knowledge of the incumbents performance in o¢ ce as well as information revealed
about the incumbent during his previous successful campaign(s).22 Strategy di¤erences
may arise if voters are risk-averse and prefer a lower variance candidate to a higher variance
candidate with the same expected value.
There are also several ways to add additional players to this model. For instance, this
model could provide an interesting beginning for considering endogenous candidate choice.
There may be a marked e¤ect on nomination choices of competing political parties given their
knowledge of how the upcoming election will play out. Also, what if there are independent
parties (such as "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" and other 527 groups) that have the ability
to launch advertisements? What if the independent monitors are strategic, and generally
favor one party or candidate over the other? Allowing these possibilities could be especially
relevant for elections where the players can reveal misinformation.
In order to answer the important questions about negative campaigning, I have provided
a campaign strategy framework that claries the meaning of negative campaigning, and
a campaign strategy game where candidates choose from positive campaigning, negative
campaigning, issue bolstering, and issue di¤erentiation. By providing this foundation, this
study may serve as the starting point for more fruitful research on how candidates choose
campaign strategies and on how those strategies a¤ect voter opinion and election results.
22The setup of this model is in the appendix.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Voter Expected Utility
The voters expected utility for each candidate, UV (`), is originally  2q + x(2p   1): If
the voter is naive, calculating d`(a j `;  `) just requires recording changes in the voters
expected utility.
Issue Di¤erentiation (revealing (I ` = 1) or (I ` =  1)) lowers UV ( `) by 1  2q.
Issue Bolstering (revealing (I` = 0)) increases UV (`) by 2q. Thus Q, the greater of
2q and (1   2q), determines (independent of candidate types) which issue strategy has the
largest potential upside.
Negative Campaigning (revealing (C ` =  x)) decreases UV ( `) by 2xp.
Positive Campaigning (revealing (C` = x)) increases UV (`) by 2x(1  p).
Thus P , the greater of p and (1  p), determines (independent of candidate types) which
character strategy has the largest potential upside. If the expected values of each candidate
change, it doesnt change strategy just the likelihood of winning. For example, suppose
candidate A may be either x1 or x2, where x1 + x2 6= 0: This change can be transformed
about zero by focusing on the di¤erence between the two values. Thus, assuming that
x1 > x2,
Type Probability
x1 p
x2 1  p
can be transformed into
Type Probability
x1+x2
x2
+ x1 x2
x2
p
x1+x2
x2
  x1 x2
x2
1  p
The transformed utility function has a constant portion x1+x2
x2
and a variable portion that
depends on the random draw. The utility from electing candidate A would then be  2q+
x1+x2
x2
+ x1 x2
x2
(2p   1). Then, letting x1 x2
x2
= xA, campaign strategies could be carried
out just as in the original (good or bad character) scenario, because the constant term will
have no e¤ect on the strategies; it will just increase the incumbents likelihood of winning.
This same type of adjustment works on the issue dimension once it is simplied into two
components: extremist (I` = 1) or not extremist (I` = 0).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 4:
First, I show that a candidate using a has no incentive to deviate. Suppose that the
opponent  ` is using a, and that using a changes voter utility by . For all other
themes a0 6= a, max d`(a0`; a) = w < , because  maximizes d`(a) and because choosing
a0 6= areduces d` further by some non-negative amount due to the inference that ` didnt
choose a: So, candidate ` does best by choosing a. Now suppose that the opponent  ` is
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using a ` 6= a: By the same logic a will do best unless it reveals redundant information.
It will only be redundant if the opponent reveals good information about `: But in this case,
the voter will believe that  ` had no better alternative and conclude that ` = (0; x) and
 ` = (1; x): But then for all action choices d`(a) = 0, so ` has no incentive to deviate
from choosing a:
Next, I show that candidates unable to use a will have no incentive to deviate: Sup-
pose that the opponent is using a, but for candidate `, using a would be harmful. Let
d`(a
; a) = w0: For all other themes a0 =2 fa; ag, max d`(a0`; a) = w00 < w0, because w0
maximizes d`(a) on the dimension of a and because choosing a0 6= a reduces d` further
by some non-negative amount due to the inference that ` didnt choose a: Note that all
revelations on the dimension of a will be harmful to the campaigner, and hence the voter
will believe he is (1; x) and his opponent (0; x):
Finally, if both candidates are unable to use a, the voter will believe she has full infor-
mation, so no change in campaign strategy will impact the probability of winning.
The voters strategy is ~(s`; ~s `()) = (1; 0); for ` and `, respectively, wheneverEUV (`) >
EUV ( `), because always voting for ` in this case maximizes her expected utilityEUV (~s; ).
In the case where EUV (`) = EUV ( `), ~ = (12 ; 12) is weakly dominant because all strategies
~(s`; ~s `()) give the same expected payo¤.
6.3 Modeling Incumbency
The general model can easily be modied to capture the e¤ects of incumbency, where the
incumbent has a smaller range of possible values on each dimension. The type of Candidate
A (Incumbent), A = (IA; CA); is drawn independently from  = [f yA; 0; yAgfxA; xAg]
with the probability pA that a candidate has good personal qualities (xA), and the probability
1 pA that he has undesirable character traits ( xA). Furthermore, A has the probability 1 
2qA of being a centrist, and probability qA of favoring each extreme. The type of Candidate
B (Challenger), B = (IB; CB); is drawn independently from  = [f yB; 0; yBgfxB; xBg]
with the probability pB that a candidate has good personal qualities (xB), and the probability
1   pB that he has undesirable character traits ( xB), where xA < xB: Furthermore, B
has the probability 1  2qB of being a centrist, and probability qB of favoring each extreme,
where 0 < yA < yB  1.
Before the campaign stage, the voters expected utility from electing candidate ` is
 2q`y`   f(y`)+ x`(2p`   1)   f(x`); where f() is some function of the range between the
possible realizations of candidate locations.
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